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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities “crowdfunding”—the sale of unregistered securities over the internet
to large numbers of investors, each of whom contributes only a small amount—is a
new concept that comes in at least three types: (1) retail crowdfunding under Title
III of the federal JOBS Act of 2012 (also known as the CROWDFUND Act); (2)
accredited crowdfunding under Title II of the JOBS Act, which is legally restricted
to accredited investors; and (3) intrastate crowdfunding under the law of the many
states that have authorized the in-state crowdfunding of securities. Which of these
three types—all at the dawn of their existence—holds the most promise?
This author has previously suggested various reasons to believe that retail
crowdfunding under the federal CROWDFUND Act will prove effective.1 Other
*

© 2016 Andrew A. Schwartz. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado
Law School. For helpful comments on prior drafts, I thank Susani Harris, Joan Heminway,
Jason Parsont, Christine Riordan, and Allison Schwartz, as well as participants in the Utah
Law Review’s 2015 symposium, “Legal Innovation & Modern Entrepreneurship.”
1
See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 614, 658–
85 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Digital Shareholder] (introducing “a set of five novel
methods for addressing uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in the
crowdfunding context”); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Nonfinancial Returns of Crowdfunding,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 565–66 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Nonfinancial
Returns] (explaining the nonfinancial benefits associated with crowdfunding, including
entertainment and community-building); Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83
U. CIN. L. REV. 515, 516 (2014) (claiming that youthful entrepreneurs will be especially well
positioned to utilize crowdfunding because of their proficiency with the internet); Andrew
A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1488–89 (2013)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities] (arguing that the crowdfunding of
securities, particularly debt, “is poised to usher in an exciting new chapter in the history of
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thoughtful commentators, however, expect that accredited investing will “dominate”
over retail crowdfunding, even rendering it “superfluous” and “not viable.”2 In their
view, the lighter regulatory burden and the freedom to raise unlimited funds makes
accredited crowdfunding much more attractive to entrepreneurs.3 State legislators,
for their part, seem to think intrastate crowdfunding has its place, given that
practically all such laws were enacted after the federal CROWDFUND Act.4 These
intrastate systems have not garnered much interest to date, however.5
Without claiming to finally resolve this debate, this Article adds the following
point: Retail crowdfunding is the most inclusive form of securities crowdfunding, in
the sense that everyone is invited regardless of who they are.6 Inclusivity is core to
the nature of crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising. It also holds a special
value in terms of law, politics, and economic prosperity. Compared with the other
two types, retail crowdfunding is clearly the most inclusive.
Accredited crowdfunding is legally limited to “accredited” (wealthy7)
investors; the middle class and poor are expressly barred.8 Intrastate crowdfunding
authorizes in-state companies to solicit in-state investors; entrepreneurs or investors
from the other forty-nine states may not lawfully participate. Retail crowdfunding,
capital formation in the United States—one in which entrepreneurs can thrive and everyone
can participate”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 283,
284 (2013) (discussing how crowdfunding can help “entrepreneurs to pursue their business
ventures in rural areas”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44–46 (2013)
(asserting that a lightly regulated form of securities crowdfunding would work best for
entrepreneurs, small-business owners, and public investors).
2
Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 281, 284 (2014) [hereinafter Parsont, Crowdfunding]; accord Michael B. Dorff, The
Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 517–18 (2014) [hereinafter Dorff,
Siren Call].
3
Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 284–85; see also Robert B. Thompson &
Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial
Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1605 (2013); cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway,
How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 884–85
(2014) [hereinafter Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding] (suggesting
that Title III compliance costs will be higher than the accredited-only alternatives).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 65–66.
5
See infra text accompanying note 71–73.
6
See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 619–29 (describing the inclusive
vision of retail crowdfunding).
7
Federal law and SEC regulations dating from the early 1980s defined “accredited
investor” to include individuals with a net worth of $1 million. Thompson & Langevoort,
supra note 3, at 1611.
8
To be fair, there is a reasonable rationale for this exclusion: Wealthy people can, by
definition, withstand an investment loss that would cause devastating financial harm to a
person of modest means. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1064 (2009) [hereinafter
Langevoort, The SEC].
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by contrast, will be inclusive and open to all Americans, rich and poor, young and
old, from coast to coast. This inclusive nature of retail crowdfunding provides an
advantage that the other forms necessarily lack.9
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II gives a brief introduction to the field
of securities crowdfunding. Part III then delves more deeply into the three different
types: retail, accredited, and intrastate. Finally, Part IV contends that, because
inclusivity is important to crowdfunding (and otherwise), retail crowdfunding holds
an underappreciated advantage over the other two forms. A short conclusion
recounts the argument.
II. SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING IN GENERAL
Securities crowdfunding is a new idea that builds off of the earlier concept of
reward crowdfunding.10 In reward crowdfunding, financial backers of a project
receive its fruits, such as a book, CD, or video game. Websites such as Kickstarter
have practiced reward crowdfunding for the past five years, during which time it has
quickly grown into a multibillion-dollar market.11
Securities crowdfunding takes the concept one step further by providing
backers with a security, such as a share of stock, without registering the securities
with the authorities.12 Selling securities in this way does not violate the federal
securities laws (which generally mandate that one register securities with the SEC
before offering them to the public) because legal “exemptions” have been put into
place: Retail crowdfunding is exempt under Title III of the new JOBS Act,13
accredited crowdfunding is exempt under Title II of the JOBS Act,14 and intrastate
crowdfunding is exempt under the longstanding intrastate exemption.15 The next
Part describes these three types in more detail.
9

This need not be an exclusive choice; a single company may potentially use multiple
methods.
10
See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 614–15 (stating that securities
crowdfunding takes the idea of reward crowdfunding “one step further”). See generally
Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 1, at 1458–60 (explaining that securities
crowdfunding is an idea modeled on the concept of reward crowdfunding).
11
See Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats
[https://perma.cc/L6EA-BMBL] (last updated Apr. 5, 2016, 8:24 PM) (reporting that 10
million backers have contributed a total of $2.2 billion to Kickstarter projects).
12
See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829 (2014)
[hereinafter Heminway, Investor and Market Protection] (defining “securities
crowdfunding” as “an offering of securities made over the internet to a broad-based,
unstructured group of investors”); Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 1, at 1458
(defining “securities crowdfunding” as “the sale of unregistered securities over the internet
to large numbers of retail investors, each of whom only invests a small dollar amount”).
13
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
14
See id. § 77d(b)(1).
15
Id. § 77c(a)(11); 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
16304(6-A)(D) (2014) (invoking exemption based on Rule 504 of Regulation D).
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III. THREE TYPES OF SECURITIES CROWDFUNDING
There are at least three distinct types of securities crowdfunding: retail
crowdfunding, accredited crowdfunding, and intrastate crowdfunding.16 This Part
will briefly describe each of these three types and the distinctions between them.17
A. Retail Crowdfunding
Retail crowdfunding was authorized by Title III of the federal JOBS Act, also
known as the CROWDFUND Act.18 This is the best known and most carefully
studied form of securities crowdfunding (even though it has yet to go into effect).19

16

A potential fourth type of crowdfunding would be based on Title IV of the JOBS Act,
which amended Regulation A into what is sometimes referred to as “Regulation A+.” See
Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation: The
Impact—If Any—of the Jobs Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 839–47 (2014) (discussing Title IV and
the amendments to Regulation A). Although some view Regulation A+ as a type of
crowdfunding, Jonathan Zonis and Jason W. Parsont state that this is a complex law that may
be best thought of as a hybrid between crowdfunding and an ordinary IPO. The U.S. Menu
of Early-Stage Capital-Raising Options: Lessons for the European Commission, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG, June 22, 2015, http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/06/22/the-u-s-menu-ofearly-stage-capital-raising-options-lessons-for-the-european-commission [https://perma.cc/
U932-MMT3] (“Regulation A may also provide a better forum for ‘crowdfunding’ than the
proposed crowdfunding regulation given that it permits access to all investors and also
permits widespread general solicitation and advertising with few constraints.”). A company
seeking to use Regulation A+ must file an elaborate disclosure document (including, for
instance, “management discussion and analysis”) that must be reviewed and approved by the
SEC (and state securities regulators, depending on the type of offering), and if the company
grows to sufficient size, it would be forced to register as a public company. Thomas J. Kim,
Regulation A+ Takes Effect, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 20,
2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/20/regulation-a-takes-effect [https://perma.
cc/B5EP-9QSQ]. Hence, although Regulation A+ holds significant potential for capital
formation, Zonis and Parsont, supra, the present discussion will focus on the three forms that
are closest to the core of the crowdfunding concept. See Anna Pinedo, It’s Not
Crowdfunding!, MOFO JUMPSTARTER (July 13, 2015), http://www.mofojumpstarter.com/20
15/07/13/its-not-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/XB5Y-QUSX] (arguing that Regulation
A+ should not be classified as a type of crowdfunding).
17
For a more complete discussion of each, see Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2
(describing accredited crowdfunding); Matthew A. Pei, Intrastate Crowdfunding, 2014
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 854, 854 (describing intrastate crowdfunding); Schwartz,
Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 1 (describing retail crowdfunding).
18
The terms “Title III” and “CROWDFUND Act” are used interchangeably herein.
19
Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 300 (citation omitted) (suggesting that retail
crowdfunding has received “disproportionate attention” compared with accredited
crowdfunding). Pursuant to the SEC’s final regulations, released while this Article was in
production, Title III crowdfunding will commence in May 2016.
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Title III amends the Securities Act to add a new exemption20 for the crowdfunding
of securities, including common stock, preferred stock, bonds, or any sort of
investment contract.21 There are, of course, a number of limits and rules,22 including
the following:
Companies seeking funds through retail crowdfunding23 must provide some
basic disclosures to the public, including (a) the name, address, and website of the
company; (b) the names of directors, officers, and substantial investors; (c) a
description of the business and the anticipated business plan; and (d) a description
of the issuer’s financial condition.24 Issuers must also provide a description of the
purpose and intended use of the proceeds, the target offering amount,25 the price of
the securities to be offered, and a description of the ownership and capital structure
of the issuer.26 Following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must annually file with
the SEC, and make available to investors, financial statements and a report on the
results of operations.27 Companies may not raise more than $1 million annually;28
investors may invest only up to 5% of their income or net worth each year;29
transactions must be conducted through a “funding portal”;30 companies may not

20

An exemption from the ordinary registration requirement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77t,
77h-1 (2012).
21
Id. § 77d(a)(6); see generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946)
(“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”). This author has opined that
debt may be a particularly attractive type of security to crowdfund. Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Securities, supra note 1, at 1482–89.
22
For a more complete discussion, see Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note
1, at 1460–66.
23
Almost any domestic company may legally engage in retail crowdfunding. The
exceptions are publicly traded companies, investment companies, and foreign companies, all
of which are prohibited from employing the crowdfunding exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 77d1(f)(1) (2012).
24
Id. § 77d-1(b)(1). The disclosure requirements concerning the financial condition of
the issuer vary depending on the size of the offering. Offerings under $100,000 or less must
provide income tax returns for the last fiscal year and unaudited financial statements certified
as accurate by the principle executive officer. For offerings between $100,000 and $500,000,
financial statements reviewed by an independent public accountant are required. For
offerings between $500,000 and the maximum of $1 million, audited financial statements
are required. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i)-(iii).
25
Issuers must also announce the deadline to reach their target amount as well as regular
updates regarding the progress of the issuer meeting its target amount. If the issuer fails to
reach the goal, the whole transaction is cancelled. Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
26
Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E)–(H).
27
Id. § 77d-1(b)(4)).
28
Id. § 77d(a)(6)(A)).
29
Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i). Wealthy investors can invest up to 10%. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
30
Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C). A broker dealer is also fine. Id.
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advertise to the public;31 and investors may cancel a pledge before the deal closes.32
Crowdfunded securities cannot be transferred or sold by investors for one year after
the date of purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an offering
registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or family member.33 Finally, the
CROWDFUND Act authorizes civil actions for fraud against issuers, directors and
officers.34
Retail crowdfunding has yet to commence, but even so there is already a rich
academic literature on the (hypothetical) merits of this new way of selling
securities.35 That literature, however, largely focuses on questions of efficiency and
efficacy, rather than inclusivity.36 This may be due, in part, to the fact that inclusivity
is such an integral part of retail crowdfunding that commentators do not see a need
to make the point.37
B. Accredited Crowdfunding
Although authorized in the same federal statute as retail crowdfunding,
accredited crowdfunding under Title II of the JOBS Act is quite distinct from retail
crowdfunding under Title III of that Act. Whereas retail crowdfunding was created
out of whole cloth, accredited crowdfunding builds off of the longstanding private
placement exemption found in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, as well as
Regulation D and Rule 506 thereunder, which date from the early 1980s.38
Rule 506 provides a registration exemption for private offerings made
exclusively to “accredited” (wealthy) investors.39 Over time, Rule 506 offerings
31

Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
Id. § 77d-1(a)(7).
33
Id. § 77d-1(e).
34
Id. § 77d-1(c)(1)(A), (3). All in all, the regulatory burden imposed by Title III appears
to be significant. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 3, at 1605 (asserting that Title III
imposes “a quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and any
intermediaries that assist them”). The red tape does not appear to be insurmountable,
however. See generally Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 610–14 (expressing
optimism regarding the prospects of retail crowdfunding).
35
See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–2; Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1433 (2012); Heminway, How
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding, supra note 3, at 865; Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Securities, supra note 1, at 1457; Robert H. Steinhoff, The Next British Invasion Is Securities
Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities Through the Crowd Can Succeed in
the United States, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 661, 661 (2015).
36
See, e.g., Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 613 (explaining that the
motivating question for the article is “whether crowdfunding can respond to [the] three
fundamental problems [of entrepreneurial finance] in an efficient way”).
37
But see infra Part IV.B (discussing inclusivity and its importance to retail
crowdfunding).
38
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
39
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2012). An SEC regulation adopted in 1982 clarified that
32
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have become an important source of business capital in the United States.40 For
years, offerings under Rule 506 could be made only to accredited investors with a
preexisting relationship with the company (or its agent).41 Public advertising or
“general solicitation” was specifically prohibited by Rule 506.42
In a significant change,43 Title II of the JOBS Act eliminated the prohibition
against advertising and general solicitation in Rule 506, so long as all of the
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.44 This change (which was put
into effect by the SEC in 2013), combined with the power of the internet, has allowed
for an accredited-only form of crowdfunding to quickly develop on websites like
AngelList and CircleUp, which are currently operating and available to accredited
investors nationwide.45

wealthy people—those with a net worth of more than $1 million—qualified as “accredited”
investors and, as such, were endowed with special investing privileges. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.501(a)(5), .215(f) (2014); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3390–91 (2013) (“The dirty little secret of U.S. securities law is
that the rich not only have more money—they also have access to types of wealth-generating
investments not available, by law, to the average investor. An investor with enough income
or a high enough net worth (an accredited investor) can invest in a private equity fund, for
example, or in still-private companies before they go public. The rest of us cannot.”). The
theory is that wealthy investors do not need all the legal protections that ordinarily go along
with securities offerings because their wealth gives them the “ability to absorb losses.”
Langevoort, The SEC, supra note 8, at 1064 (2009).
40
Regulation D is “the dominant offering method in terms of aggregate capital raised
in the U.S.,” and Rule 506 is far and away the most popular component of Regulation D.
VLAD IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION 3 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec103111_analysis-reg-d-offering.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z488-77CT].
41
See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 151, 169 n.112 (2010) (noting that Rule 506 offerings had (at the time) to be limited
“to those investors with whom the issuer or its selling agent has a preexisting relationship”).
42
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2014) (noting “neither the issuer nor any person acting on
its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general
advertising”).
43
See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction
IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 249 (noting “general solicitation for private placements
could be a sea change for capital raising outside of the IPO”).
44
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. § 201 (2d Sess. 2012).
The issuer must also “take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are
accredited investors, using such methods as determined by the Commission.” Id. § 201(a)(1).
45
See Darian Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 561, 577 (2015) (“Several Title II sites have come into existence since the JOBS Act
was passed. By any measure, including funds raised by these sites for their own operations
and startups using these sites to successfully raise funds, these Title II sites are off to a
promising start.”).
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Accredited crowdfunding arguably holds several significant advantages over
retail crowdfunding, primarily because Rule 506, being designed exclusively for
accredited investors who can “fend for themselves,”46 is free of the limits and
obligations Congress adopted in Title III.47 While retail crowdfunding limits
companies to raising just $1 million per year, accredited crowdfunding has no limit
on the amount a company can raise.48 Similarly, retail crowdfunding imposes a cap
on the amount each investor can contribute, but accredited crowdfunding has no
such cap.49 Retail crowdfunding mandates certain specific disclosures, both at the
time of the offering and annually thereafter; accredited crowdfunding has no
analogous disclosure requirement.50
Given all of these advantages of Title II compared with Title III, commentators
have questioned why anyone would ever use retail crowdfunding when accredited
crowdfunding is available.51 One observer has predicted that “accredited
crowdfunding is likely to dominate and . . . could render retail crowdfunding
superfluous . . . .”52 Professor Michael Dorff agrees: “Given all the advantages
accredited crowdfunding has over retail, issuers would be foolish to use the retail
exemption if they were also able to attract the interest of accredited investors . . . .”53
And Professors Robert Thompson and Donald Langevoort concur as well, saying “it
is difficult for us to see why a rational start-up entrepreneur would find it appealing
to use [retail crowdfunding] at all.”54
These critiques are valid, and the advantages of accredited crowdfunding are
real, but these scholars miss an important point that will be discussed further in Part
IV below: The inclusive nature of retail crowdfunding gives it a special value that
accredited crowdfunding necessarily lacks.

46

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–125 (1953) (“Exemption from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act is [appropriate for an] offering to those who
are shown to be able to fend for themselves . . . .”).
47
Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 281.
48
Id. at 301.
49
Id. at 316.
50
Id. at 319–20. Retail crowdfunding also has stricter antifraud provisions than
accredited crowdfunding. See id. at 302–03. This may or may not count as an advantage,
because investors may prefer to invest in companies subject to the stricter standards for retail
crowdfunding.
51
E.g., id. at 284; Dorff, Siren Call, supra note 2, at 519; Thompson & Langevoort,
supra note 3, at 1605; see Hurt, supra note 43, at 250 (noting “the new Rule 506 . . . surely
will result in a decrease in interest in crowdfunding”).
52
See Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 284.
53
See Dorff, Siren Call, supra note 2, at 519.
54
See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 3, at 1605. Thompson and Langevoort
expect that accredited crowdfunding will even “come to dominate the IPO.” Id. at 1619.
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C. Intrastate Crowdfunding
Intrastate crowdfunding largely mimics retail crowdfunding,55 except it all
takes place within a single state.56 Acting pursuant to the venerable exemption for
purely intrastate offerings,57 roughly one-third of states have adopted legislation
authorizing securities crowdfunding within their borders, including Colorado,58
Georgia,59 Massachusetts,60 Michigan,61 Tennessee,62 and Texas.63 These intrastate
legislative schemes bear a close resemblance to retail crowdfunding, with small
tweaks here and there.64 The result is that intrastate crowdfunding is largely identical
to retail crowdfunding in form and substance.
The primary impetus for intrastate crowdfunding appears to be the delay in
finalizing regulations for retail crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act.65 That
federal law was enacted in 2012, and it directed the SEC to promulgate rules to
implement retail crowdfunding Title III by the end of 2012 but, due to competing
priorities, the SEC missed the deadline and issued only a preliminary proposal in
late 2013.66 Frustrated with the SEC’s pace, a number of states took it into their own
hands to establish intrastate crowdfunding laws modeled on Title III.67
Some of these states made substantive changes in an attempt to improve on the
Title III exemption but, apart from the intrastate aspect, the systems are quite

55

See supra Part II.A.
See generally Pei, supra note 17, at 870.
57
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
58
COLO. REV. STAT § 11-51-308.5 (2015).
59
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08, et seq. (2012).
60
950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015).
61
MCL § 451.2102A et seq.
62
S.B. 1481, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014).
63
TEX. § 139.25. Notably absent from this list are some of the most populous states,
including California and New York.
64
Pei, supra note 17, at 869–86 (comparing state and federal securities crowdfunding
and finding them similar).
65
Id. at 857 (“[A]lthough the SEC released proposed rules for securities-based
crowdfunding on October 23, 2013, those rules still have not been finalized. Not waiting on
the SEC, a number of states have enacted their own crowdfunding exemptions.”); Russ
Iuculano, Letter from North American Securities Administrators Association to National
Conference of State Legislatures 2 (Jan. 17 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/NASAA-Letter-to-NCSL-on-State-Crowdfunding-Bills-1-1714.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T2U-T6JA] (“Due to the SEC’s delay in rule
implementation . . . several states have proposed or enacted their own state crowdfunding
bills as an alternative.”); Hugh H. Makens, State Intrastate Crowdfunding, SW017 ALI-CLE
217 (2015) (“While the world has awaited the coming of [federal] securities crowdfunding,
the states have not been idle. In fact, they have been enacting and proposing intrastate
crowdfunding laws and rules at an overwhelming rate.”).
66
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013).
67
Iuculano, supra note 65, at 2.
56
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similar.68 Most of the distinctions are designed to make the intrastate systems more
liberal than the federal version: Some states have higher issuance limits (e.g., $2
million as opposed to $1 million under Title III); disclosure rules are generally less
onerous; some states have higher limits for investors (e.g., $10,000 for ordinary
investors, unlimited for accredited ones); some states do not require the use of an
intermediary; and some states allow direct advertising to potential investors.69
Intrastate crowdfunding is operational in a number of states but does not appear
likely to play a significant role going forward,70 despite the enthusiasm on the part
of state legislatures.71 Local companies seem to have little present interest in
utilizing this method of raising capital,72 and once Title III goes live and nationwide
retail crowdfunding commences, even this low level of participation may wane.73
***
This Part discussed the three types of securities crowdfunding. It relayed the
conventional wisdom that accredited crowdfunding has the brightest future and that
retail crowdfunding and intrastate crowdfunding are destined for the dustbin. The
next and final Part argues that this conventional wisdom, while holding much truth,
has failed to appreciate that the inclusive nature of retail crowdfunding gives it a
special value that the others lack.

68

Pei, supra note 17, at 869–86.
Id. at 898–905 (comparing intrastate securities crowdfunding with Title III). Not all
the changes are liberalizing. For instance, the Wisconsin and Michigan statutes require
quarterly reports from crowdfunding companies, while Title III calls only for annual reports.
Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.202(26) (West 2012), and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
451.2202 (West 2011), with 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4) (2012).
70
Theodore Weitz & Thomas D. Halket, State Crowdfunding and the Intrastate
Exemption Under Federal Securities Laws—Less Than Meets the Eye?, 34 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 521, 564 (2015) (stating that “expectations of the usefulness of state crowdfunding
laws [are] largely illusory”).
71
Id. at 563; see, e.g., Tamara Chuang, Hickenlooper Signs Equity-Crowdfunding Law
to Let Anyone Invest Locally, DENVER POST (Apr. 13, 2015, 6:30 PM), (reporting that an
intrastate crowdfunding bill “sped through the [Colorado] legislature, passing in less than
seven weeks,” “with no opposition”), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_27906349/
hicklooper-signs-equity-crowdfunding-law-let-anyone-invest
[https://perma.cc/FZ3NQX9Y].
72
Pei, supra note 17, at 858 (stating that “so far, the state exemptions have been used
only sparingly . . . estimat[ing], only about twenty companies have tried to use the Kansas
and Georgia exemptions since their adoption in 2011”).
73
Cf. id. at 858 (querying whether intrastate crowdfunding is unpopular because “the
state exemptions are superfluous . . . now that the federal rules are almost in effect”). In the
end, intrastate crowdfunding legislation can perhaps be seen less as actually creating a new
type of securities market and more as sending a message to the SEC to hurry up and finalize
the regulations under Title III. But see id. (arguing that, “in spite of the impending federal
exemption, state-level crowdfunding exemptions can still play a useful role”).
69
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IV. THE INCLUSIVE NATURE OF RETAIL CROWDFUNDING
Inclusivity is a valuable and important aspect of economic institutions, and is
the very essence of what makes crowdfunding different from other methods of
securities offerings. Of the three types of securities crowdfunding considered above,
retail crowdfunding is plainly the most inclusive. This gives retail crowdfunding a
distinctive advantage over accredited crowdfunding and intrastate crowdfunding.
A. Inclusivity Is Valuable
Inclusivity is an important value in our society, both for its inherent and its
instrumental value.74 An inclusive environment, broadly defined as one in which “all
people feel valued and respected and have access to the same opportunities,” can
generate positive effects.75 This is an intuitive idea: It should come as no surprise
that people like it when they are included and treated as an equal worthy of respect.76
Thus the concept of inclusivity has been a driving force behind many legal reforms
over time, from the one-person-one-vote rule of constitutional law77 to the
increasingly inclusive capacity rules of contract law.78
Most importantly for present purposes, economists have persuasively claimed
that inclusive economic institutions are vital to achieving a prosperous society.79
“Inclusive economic institutions” are those that “allow and encourage participation
by the great mass of people in economic activities . . . and that enable individuals to
make the choices they wish.”80 Such institutions provide “economic opportunities
74

E.g., Christine M. Riordan, Diversity Is Useless Without Inclusivity, HARV. BUS. REV.,
June 5, 2014 (reporting on the late-nineteenth-century writings of William James, in which
he observed that “human beings possess a fundamental need for inclusion and belonging”).
75
Id. (referring to research showing that inclusion in business organizations “has the
promise of many positive individual and organizational outcomes such as reduced turnover,
greater altruism, and team engagement”).
76
Cf. FREDERICK A. MILLER & JUDITH H. KATZ, THE KALEEL JAMISON CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., THE PATH FROM EXCLUSIVE CLUB TO INCLUSIVE ORGANIZATION: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS 2 (2007), https://articles.extension.org/sites/default/files/the%20
Path%20from%20Exclusive%20Club.pdf [https://perma.cc/P56T-MC24] (explaining that
inclusion in the workplace occurs “when everyone has a sense of belonging; feels respected,
valued and seen for who they are as individuals; and feels a level of supportive energy and
commitment from leaders, colleagues and others so that all people—individually and
collectively—can do [their] best work”).
77
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (“[O]ne person’s vote must be counted
equally with those of all other voters . . . .”).
78
See Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of
the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407, 416–20
[hereinafter Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight].
79
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 75 (2012)
(“Inclusive economic institutions foster economic activity, productivity growth, and
economic prosperity.”).
80
Id. at 74; see also id. at 3–4 (“Countries such as Great Britain and the United States
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not just for the elite but for a broad cross-section of society.”81 This defines securities
crowdfunding to a T, for the very concept is to invite “the great mass of people”—
the crowd—to invest in whichever startup companies and small businesses they
choose.
B. Inclusivity Is Essential to Crowdfunding
Inclusivity is foundational to securities crowdfunding. The essence of the
concept is the creation of an inclusive market where ordinary investors will be able
to make investments that have traditionally been the exclusive purview of wealthy
and connected investors.82
We can see the importance of this type of inclusivity by the fact that numerous
scholarly authorities, as well as the SEC itself, reject the notion that accredited
crowdfunding even qualifies as “crowdfunding.”83 In their view, the term
“crowdfunding” implies an inclusive form of investing that is open to investors of
any level of wealth, and thus a term like “accredited crowdfunding” is a
contradiction in terms.84 Similarly, one thoughtful commentator expressly excludes
intrastate crowdfunding from her definition of the term on the ground that it is
exclusive to residents of one state.85
became rich because their citizens . . . created a society . . . where the great mass of people
could take advantage of economic opportunities.”).
81
Id. at 75.
82
Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 619–20 (explaining that a core
purpose of crowdfunding is to “democratize the market for financing speculative companies
by inviting ordinary people—‘digital shareholders’—to make investments that are currently
offered solely to accredited (wealthy) investors”); accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-308.5
(2015)
(“The
general
assembly
hereby
.
.
.
[d]eclares
that . . . crowdfunding . . . will . . . democratize venture capital formation . . . .”).
83
Crowdfunding, File No. S7-09-13, at 9 n.12 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, and 249) (excluding Title II activity under revised
Rule 506 from the concept, for “crowdfunding is premised on permitting sales of securities
to any interested person, not just to investors who meet specific qualifications, such as
accredited investors”); Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 563 n.11 (“In my estimation, which is
consistent with the nomenclature in the JOBS Act, Title II is a step toward crowdfunding but
is not actually crowdfunding. Title III, on the other hand, is crowdfunding . . . .”); id. at 587
(claiming that “Title II [web]sites are not equity crowdfunding at all”); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Business Lawyering in the Crowdfunding Era, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 149, 151
(2014) [hereinafter Heminway, Business Lawyering] (arguing that accredited crowdfunding
should not be considered a form of crowdfunding); cf. Hurt, supra note 43, at 250 (observing
that accredited crowdfunding “eliminates one important promise of crowdfunding: the
democratization of investing”).
84
But see, e.g., Parsont, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 281 (coining the term
“accredited crowdfunding”); Dorff, Siren Call, supra note 2, at 518.
85
Heminway, Investor and Market Protection, supra note 12, at 829 n.7 (excluding
intrastate crowdfunding from author’s definition of crowdfunding); Heminway, Business
Lawyering, supra note 83, at 151.
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This all seems clearly correct. One core pillar of securities crowdfunding is the
idea of an inclusive system that invites all investors to participate. Inclusivity is
essential to crowdfunding and drives the theory underlying the form. For one thing,
securities crowdfunding is supposed to benefit from the “wisdom of the crowd,”
which works only with an inclusive crowd made up of many different types of
people.86 For another, securities crowdfunding can provide nonfinancial benefits,
such as altruism, community engagement, and political expression,87 and these
aspects are enhanced by inclusivity.
C. Retail Crowdfunding Is the Most Inclusive Type
Whatever else can be said about it,88 retail crowdfunding offers a highly
inclusive vision of a securities market where all Americans89 are invited to invest in
startups and other business ventures.90 Retail crowdfunding is the only type of
securities crowdfunding where the whole nationwide “crowd” is invited to
participate.91
As President Obama said when he signed the CROWDFUND Act into law,
“Because of this bill, start-ups and small business will now have access to a big, new
pool of potential investors—namely, the American people. For the first time,
ordinary Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they
believe in.”92 In other words, a fundamental and express goal of retail crowdfunding
is to break down the differential treatment of accredited investors and everyone
else.93

86

Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 659–63.
Schwartz, Nonfinancial Returns, supra note 1, at 573–80.
88
See id. at 573 n.61 (collecting predictions that crowdfunding investors will lose their
money).
89
Retail crowdfunding is presumably limited to adults eighteen and older. See generally
Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, supra note 78, at 419 (describing the modern “infancy” rule
that children become adults with the capacity to make a legal contract on their eighteenth
birthday).
90
Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 1, at 625–29; see also Joan MacLeod
Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931–32, 961 (2011) (describing retail
crowdfunding as an “inclusive capital formation model”).
91
Cf. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 1, at 1458 (defining
crowdfunding as “the sale of unregistered securities over the internet to large numbers of
retail investors, each of whom only invests a small dollar amount”) (emphasis added).
92
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2012, 2:36 PM) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing [https://perma.cc/L8DQ-KNQR].
93
See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 1 at 1459 (The “second goal” of
securities crowdfunding is to “democratize the market for financing startup companies and
small businesses and allow investors of modest means to make investments that had
previously been offered solely to wealthy, so-called ‘accredited’ investors.”).
87
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In direct contrast stands accredited crowdfunding, which is an extension of the
exclusive world of private placements and Rule 506.94 That type of financing is
limited to wealthy and institutional investors and expressly excludes retail investors;
it is the opposite of an inclusive market.95 Intrastate crowdfunding is also limited to
a small subset of investors, namely residents of a given state; out-of-state investors
need not apply. This is an exclusive system, not an inclusive one.
A company that chooses Title III, even with all its costs and burdens, thus
shows its support for inclusive economic institutions.96 By making that choice it may
generate goodwill with its investors—many of whom may also be customers,
depending on the type of business. A company that avoids retail crowdfunding and
chooses another type may save in regulatory costs, but it might suffer in the court of
public opinion. Imagine a Facebook post that says, “Friends, I invite you to invest
in my exciting startup company. We have great prospects, and I hope you will grab
a piece of the action! (NOTE: This offer is only open to those with a net worth of at
least $1 million.)” It seems likely that many “friends” would take offense by being
left out of this exciting opportunity just because they aren’t sufficiently wealthy.
And the company’s personality could be indelibly marked as elitist, with
unknowable ramifications down the line.97 In short, inclusivity has value,98 and retail
crowdfunding is the most inclusive type of securities crowdfunding.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, retail crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act has a
fundamental advantage over accredited crowdfunding and intrastate crowdfunding:
the value of inclusivity. What that is worth in a given instance may be difficult to
calculate, but it is surely more than zero. This is one reason to expect that retail
crowdfunding, once it commences, may prove more successful than many
commentators anticipate.99
94

Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 582 (“Title II sites are still acting under the traditional
angel model in important respects . . . . Title II sites could fairly be described as traditional
angel networks that have migrated online . . . .”).
95
As mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is currently considering changes to
the definition of accredited investor. Nova D. Harb et al., The SEC Considers Updating the
Accredited Investor Definition, INSIGHTS, June 2015, at 10. If, as some suggest, the definition
were to be amended to include “financially sophisticated” investors of any level of wealth,
see id. at 10–11, this would make accredited crowdfunding somewhat more inclusive,
although still not as inclusive as retail crowdfunding.
96
See supra Part IV.A.
97
Cf. PRETTY WOMAN (Buena Vista Pictures 1990) (depicting a customer snubbed by
a saleswoman due to her impoverished appearance who later avenges the insult by spending
lavishly at neighboring stores while boycotting the one where she was snubbed).
98
See supra Part IV.A.
99
In many cases it would appear there is no need to make an election among the three
types of securities crowdfunding. Depending on the so-called “integration” rules, a company
may be able to employ two, or even all three, forms.

